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Abstract. We present the first dynamic universal accumulator that allows (1) the accumulation of elements in a DDH-hard group G and (2) one who knows x such that y = g x has
— or has not — been accumulated, where g generates G, to efficiently prove her knowledge
of such x in zero knowledge, and hence without revealing, e.g., x or y.
We introduce the Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System, which allows the verifier to
authenticate anonymous users according to any access control policy expressible as a formula
of possibly negated boolean user attributes. We construct the system from our accumulator.

1

Introduction

1.1

Background

Accumulators Introduced by Benaloh and Mare [5], accumulators allow the representation of
a set of elements Y = {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn } by a single value v of size independent of Y ’s cardinality;
using an initial value u, one can accumulate Y into v by invoking the accumulating function f as
v := f(u, Y ). Accumulators should be collision-resistant [3]:
for any element y and any value v, there exists an efficiently computable witness w for y w.r.t.
v if and only if y has been accumulated into v (often abbreviated as “y is in v”). To prove that
y is in v, one can thus demonstrate the existence of a corresponding w by proving, potentially in
zero-knowledge, the knowledge of w.
Several uses of accumulators, e.g., in anonymous credential systems [10], require them to be
dynamic [12]: one can efficiently update an accumulator value by adding elements to — and
possibly later deleting them from — the value. Furthermore, when a value is updated, e.g., from v
to v 0 , the witness w for some element y w.r.t. v can also be efficiently updated to the witness w0 for
the same element y w.r.t. the new value v 0 . Such accumulators are called dynamic accumulators
(DA’s).
Dynamic universal accumulators (DUA’s) [20], on the other hand, are DA’s with the additional
property of universality: for any element set Y and any element ȳ, there exists an efficiently
computable non-membership witness w̄ for ȳ w.r.t. value v = f(u, Y ) if and only if ȳ 6∈ Y . By
demonstrating the existence of w̄, one can prove that ȳ is not in v. Non-membership witnesses
should allow efficient update.
Several existing DA/DUA constructions have f : (u, {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn }) 7→ uy1 y2 ...yn mod N as
their accumulating function [3,12,20], where N is a safe-prime product and u ∈ QR(N )3 . They
?
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permit only primes (up to a certain size) to be accumulated. Their security relies on the Strong
RSA (SRSA) assumption [3].
Nguyen [21] constructed a DA from bilinear pairings (to be defined later). It has f :
(u, {y1 , y2 , . . . , yn }) 7→ u(s+y1 )(s+y2 )...(s+yn ) as the accumulating function, where s is the master secret of the accumulator instance and u is in some group equipped with a bilinear pairing.
The construction allows elements in Zp \{−s} for some prime p to be accumulated. Its security
relies on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption [7]. Unlike the above “SRSA-based”
constructions, dynamically adding an element to a value in Nguyen’s construction requires the
knowledge of s.
An accumulator would not be too useful (at least for building anonymous credential systems)
without a suite of efficient zero-knowledge protocols for proving various facts about the accumulator values and elements. For instance, all the aforementioned constructions are equipped with
a protocol for in zero-knowledge that a commitment c opens to some element in an accumulator
value v.
Anonymous Credential Systems In an anonymous credential system (ACS) [10], those and
only those users who have registered to an organization O can authenticate their membership in O
to any verifier (e.g., a server, another organization, etc.) anonymously and unlinkably among the set
of all members in O. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [10] constructed the first ACS using a signature
scheme with efficient protocols [11] (commonly referred to as CL-signatures or P-signatures [4]) as
a key building block. Many subsequent works have taken the same approach [11,12,13,4].
In this approach, to join an organization O, a user U first registers her pseudonym, which is
simply a commitment of her pre-established private key xU , e.g., in her PKI credential. Pseudonyms
(even those of the same user) are hence unlinkable. O then issues a CL-signature σU on xU
according to the issuing protocol for CL-signatures, during which O learns nothing about xU . U
uses σU as her anonymous credential.
To be able to revoke membership efficiently, O can maintain a DA as a “white-list” of users
whose membership has not yet been revoked [12], by adding each user U ’s credential σU (or
its identifier) to its DA when U registers and, when desired, deleting σU from DA to revoke
U ’s membership. Therefore, to demonstrate her non-revoked membership in O to a verifier V , U
conducts a zero-knowledge proof that (1) she has O’s signature on her private key, and that (2) the
signature is a credential in O’s current DA. Alternatively, O can maintain a DUA as a “blacklist”
of users whose membership has been revoked [20]. In this case, to demonstrate her non-revoked
membership in O, U instead proves in zero-knowledge that (1) she has O’s signature on her private
key, and that (2) the signature is not a credential in O’s current DUA.
1.2

Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential Systems

As a major contribution of this paper, we present the Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential
System (ABACS), which generalizes the conventional notion of anonymous credential system
(ACS) [10], in a fashion analogous to how Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE) [6] generalizes public-key encryption, and how attribute certificates generalize identity certificates in X.509 PKIs [18].
Credentials in ABACS can be more precisely referred to as anonymous attribute credentials —
they are issued to users to certify their possession of an attribute, allowing the users to prove
various facts to any verifier about their credential ownership and hence attribute possession in
some anonymous fashion. ABACS thus enables privacy-preserving attribute-based access control ,
in which a server is willing to grant a user access to an object such as a file or a service so long
as the attributes possessed and/or lacked by the user satisfy the server’s access control policy on
the object, while privacy-concerned users desire to access the object by revealing merely the fact
that they satisfy the policy, and can thus conceal, e.g., their identity, how they satisfy the policy,
and etc.
In this paper, we confine ourselves to boolean attributes only. (Some attributes such as age and
weight may take a value from a wider range such as non-negative integers and real numbers, and
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are hence non-boolean.) Boolean attributes provide rich semantics for labeling objects for access
control. For example, they can represent group membership, or “roles” in Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC).
Features ABACS is a credential system with the following features.
– Flexible attribute-based access control. The verifier can choose to enforce any access control
policy expressible as a boolean attribute formula in disjunctive normal form (DNF), i.e., a
disjunction of terms, where each term is a conjunction of possibly negated boolean attributes,
e.g., “(Student ∧ Bio) ∨ (¬Bio)”.
– Multiple ACAs. To support an attribute, a corresponding Attribute Certification Authority
(ACA) is created (during setup or dynamically when needed) to issue credentials to users to
certify their possession of that attribute. These ACAs are mutually independent; an ACA can
only certify the possession of attributes for which it was created. This allows them to have
different certification procedures with different trust levels, and confines the damages of their
compromises.
– Robust accountability. The verifier accepts in the authentication only if the authenticating
user satisfies the access control policy being enforced, i.e., the corresponding boolean formula
evaluates to true on input the set of attribute for which the user has acquired a credential4 .
Hence, a user who has acquired a credential for an attribute can’t pretend that she hasn’t,
and colluding users, none of which alone satisfy the policy, can’t satisfy it by pooling together
their credentials.
– Anonymous authentication. The verifier knows only whether an authenticating user satisfies the
access control policy he is enforcing. More precisely, authentication attempts by honest users
who (resp. do not) satisfy the verifier’s policy are anonymous and unlinkable among the set of
all users who also (resp. do not) satisfy the policy.
– Anonymous certification. While ACAs must make public some data related to the certification
status of users’ attribute possession for authentication to be possible, some applications may
require that such data reveals no (computational) information about the identity of the certified
users, or more generally, no one can tell if two ACAs have issued a credential a common user.
– Efficiency and practical negation support. The authentication can be done in O(|P |) time, where
|P | is the size of the verifier’s policy measured in the number of (negated) attributes in it,
and hence regardless of, e.g., the number of users, verifiers, ACAs, or attributes that the
authenticating user possesses/lacks.
Also, a user who lacks an attribute never has to contact anyone (e.g., the corresponding ACA)
before she can prove her lack of the attribute.
Applications The two scenarios below can benefit from ABACS.
The Biology department provides free parking to its students and any visitor from outside the
department. The parking lot entrance hence enforces an access control policy of “(Bio∧Student)∨
(¬Bio)”. Identifiable authentication solutions5 would violate the privacy desired by some users.
A solution should allow different departments to locally manage their own “membership”. Also,
a visitor shouldn’t have to show up at the Biology Department to get a “¬Bio” credential before
he or she can park.
A pharmacist must check that “Fever∧¬Asthma” holds for a patient before dispensing Aspirin
(as many asthma sufferers are allergic to Aspirin), while the patient may not want to disclose her
entire medical record, e.g., when she has an unrelated genetic disorder. Also, a fever patient with
asthma with the “help” from someone without fever or asthma must still be unable to obtain
Aspirin.
4

5

A (resp. negated) attribute in a formula evaluates to true if and only if it is (resp. not) contained in
the user’s attribute set.
e.g., waving an RFID card, or an e-token installed with X.509 attribute certificates
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Solution Overview

We start with some preliminaries. We then briefly describe how we construct a DUA that allows
the accumulation of elements in a DDH-hard group, which we call DUA-DDH. Finally, we highlight
how we build ABACS from it.
2.1

Preliminaries

Bilinear pairings A bilinear pairing is a mapping from a pair of group elements to a group element.
Specifically, let G1 and G2 be some cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G1 . A
function ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing if the following holds:
–
–
–
–

Unique Representation. Each element in G1 , G2 has unique binary representation.
Bilinearity. e(Ax , g y ) = e(A, B)xy for all A, B ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zp .
Non-degeneracy. e(g, g) 6= 1, where 1 is the identity element in G2 .
Efficient Computability. e(A, B) can be computed efficiently (i.e. in polynomial time) for all
A, B ∈ G1 .

Complexity assumptions The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G is defined as follows:
On input a quadruple (h0 , h1 , hx0 , y ∗ ) ∈ G4 , output 1 if y ∗ = hx1 and 0 otherwise. We say that the
DDH assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm has non-negligible advantage over random
guessing in solving the DDH problem in G. We call a group DDH-hard if the DDH assumption
holds in the group.
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem in G = hg0 i is defined as follows: On input a
2
q
(q + 1)-tuple (g0 , g0α , g0α , . . ., g0α ) ∈ Gq+1 , output a pair (w, y) ∈ G × Z∗p , where p is the order
of G, such that w(α+y) = g0 . We say that the q-SDH assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm
has non-negligible advantage in solving the q-SDH problem in G.
Zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge In a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol [19], a prover
convinces a verifier that some statement is true without the verifier learning anything except the
validity of the statement. We use Camenisch and Stadler’s notation [14]. For example, P K{(x) :
y = g x } denotes a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol that proves the knowledge of the
discrete logarithm of y to the base g.
2.2

Our Dynamic Universal Accumulators for DDH Groups

To construct DUA-DDH, we take Nguyen’s DA construction as the point of departure; we augment
universality to it. Li et al. [20] presented a technique to augment universality to Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya’s DA construction [12]. The technique, however, requires the unique factorization of
integers and relies on the SRSA assumption, and hence is not immediately applicable to Nguyen’s
DA. Fortunately, we make the observation that the technique works as long as the domain of
accumulatable elements is (a subset of) a Euclidean domain. (In the case of Li et al.’s, the domain
is the ring of integers.) Consequently, to augment universality to Nguyen’s construction, we adapt
the technique to work on a different Euclidean domain, namely the ring of polynomials over a
finite field.
We also equip our accumulator construction with a few useful zero-knowledge protocols. Of
particular importance is the following pair:

 P K {(x, y) : C = Com1 (x) ∧ D = Com2 (y) ∧ y = g x ∧ y is in v)}


P K {(x, y) : C = Com1 (x) ∧ D = Com2 (y) ∧ y = g x ∧ y is not in v)}

where Com1 and Com2 are commitment schemes and g generates a DDH group, the elements
in which can be accumulated in our accumulator. We construct the protocol using Pedersen’s
commitment scheme [22] and Camenisch’s technique for proving double discrete logarithms [14].
The construction has a complexity of O(λ) for a cheating probability of 2−λ .
This protocol is the cornerstone of our ABACS construction.
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Our Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System

Let G be a DDH group. Let ACA i be the ACA that certifies users’ possession of attribute i.
Each ACA i instantiates and maintains a DUA-DDH Ai of its own, but for the same G, and
independently picks a generator gi of G at random.
Let U be a user with a pre-established private key x. For each attribute i she possesses, she
can get certified by ACA i by providing her pseudonym yi = gix w.r.t. ACA i. ACA i then adds yi
to its Ai . To later revoke the certification, ACA i can simply delete yi from Ai . Finally, for each
attribute j U lacks, she need not do anything (such as contacting ACA j); her pseudonym w.r.t.
ACA j is by default not in ACA j’s Aj .
Each ACA i publishes Ai , gi (with a proof of their correct generation) and the list of
pseudonyms that have been added in Ai . Thanks to the DDH assumption, no one — not even to
the ACAs — can tell which user a pseudonym belongs to, or whether two ACAs’ pseudonym lists
contain a common user (non-negligibly better than random guessing).
From the published information, a user can compute a (resp. non-) membership witness for
each attribute i she has (resp. not) been certified. The first-time computation takes O(|Li |) time
when ACA i has certified |Li | users. This computation can be further reduced to O(1) by moving
the computation to ACA which is in possession of the auxiliary information of the accumulator.
Updating the witness in the future take constant time per each change in the list of certified users.
User U who possesses attribute i and has been certified by ACA i can prove such fact to any
verifier during authentication by proving that she has the knowledge of some x such that yi = gix
is in Ai . Similarly, if U lacks attribute j, she can prove the fact by proving that yj = gjx is not in
Aj . These proofs can be accomplished in constant time. Generalizing the proof using a standard
technique [16], a user can prove the validity of any DNF boolean attribute formula in time linear
in the size of the formula.
Due to page limitation, the presentation of our ABACS ends here. More details about its syntax,
construction, security formalism and proofs can be found in the full version of this paper [2].

3

Our Dynamic Universal Accumulators for DDH Groups

3.1

Definitions

We incrementally define Dynamic Universal Accumulators for DDH Groups (DUA-DDH’s). We
start by adapting Li et al.’s definition of universality to pairing-based accumulators.
Definition 1 (Universal Accumulators (UAs)). A universal accumulator is a scheme with
the following properties:
– Efficient generation There exists a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm Gen
that, on input security parameter 1λ , outputs a tuple (f, g, Yf , u, tf ), where f is a function
Uf × Yf0 → Uf and g is another function Uf → Ug for some domains Yf 0 , Uf , Ug ; Yf ⊆ Yf0 is the
domain for accumulatable elements; tf is some optional auxiliary information about f; and u
is a element in Uf . We assume the tuple (f, g) is drawn uniformly at random from its domain.
– Quasi-commutativity For all (f, g, Yf , ·) ← Gen(1λ ), v ∈ Uf and y1 , y2 ∈ Yf0 , we have f( f(v,
y1 ), y2 ) = f( f(v, y2 ), y1 ). Hence, if Y = {y1 , . . ., yk } ⊂ Yf0 , then we can denote f( · · · f( f(v,
y1 ), y2 ) · · · , yk ) by f(v, Y ) unambiguously.
– Efficient evaluation For all (f, g, Yf , tf , u) ← Gen(1λ ), v ∈ Uf , and Y ⊂ Yf so that |Y | is
polynomial in λ, the function g ◦ f(v, Y ) is computable in time polynomial in λ. v = g ◦
f(u, Y ) represents the set Y . We call v the accumulator value for Y and say that y has been
accumulated into v (or y is “in” v), for all y ∈ Y .
– Membership (resp. non-membership) witnesses For all (f, g, Yf , ·) ← Gen(1λ ), there
exists a relation Ω (resp. Ω) that defines membership (resp. non-membership) witnesses: w
(resp. w) is a valid membership (resp. non-membership) witness for element y ∈ Yf w.r.t.
accumulator value v ∈ Uf if and only if Ω(w, y, v) = 1 (resp. Ω(w, y, v) = 1). Membership
witness (resp. non-membership witness) should be efficiently computable (in polynomial-time
in λ) with tf .
t
u
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The security of universal accumulators requires that it is hard to find a valid membership (resp.
non-membership) witness for an element that is not in (resp. is indeed in) an accumulator value
w.r.t. that accumulator value. We employ a strong definition in which the adversary is considered
successful even if he present an element that is outside the intended domain of the accumulator (Yf0
instead of Yf ). Accumulators with this stronger sense of security improves efficiency of systems
on which it is based because users within this system needs not conduct proof to demonstrate
the elements presented is inside the intended domain of the accumulator. Below we give a precise
definition.
Definition 2 (Security of Universal Accumulators (UAs)). A universal accumulator is
secure if, for any PPT algorithm A, both P1 and P2 are negligible in λ, where:



λ
); (y, w, Y ) ← A(g ◦ f, g, Yf , u) :

 P1 = Pr (f, g, Yf0 , u, ·) ← Gen(1
,


Y ⊂ Yf ∧ y ∈ Yf0 \Y ∧ Ω(w, y, g ◦ f(u, Y )) = 1





(f, g, Yf , u) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← A(g ◦ f, g, Yf , u) :


.
 P2 = Pr
Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ Ω(w, y, g ◦ f(u, Y )) = 1
t
u
Definition 3 (Dynamic Universal Accumulators (DUAs)). A DUA is an UA with the following additional properties:
– Efficient update of accumulator There exists an efficient algorithm D1 such that for all
v = g ◦ f(u, Y ), y ∈
/ Y and v̂ ← D1 (tf , v, y), we have v̂ = g ◦ f(u, Y ∪ {y}). If y ∈ Y instead,
then we have v̂ = g ◦ f(1, Y \ {y}) instead.
– Efficient update of membership witnesses Let v and v̂ be the original and updated
accumulator values respectively and ŷ be the newly added (or deleted) element. There exists
an efficient algorithm D2 that, on input y, w, v, v̂ with y 6= ŷ and Ω(w, y, v) = 1, outputs ŵ
such that Ω(ŵ, y, v̂) = 1.
– Efficient update of non-membership witnesses Let v and v̂ be the original and updated
accumulator values respectively and ŷ be the newly added (or deleted) element. There exists
an efficient algorithm D3 that, on input y, w, v, v̂ with y 6= ŷ and Ω(w, y, v) = 1, outputs ŵ
such that Ω(ŵ, y, v̂) = 1.
t
u
In the above, we call an algorithm “efficient” if its time complexity is independent of the
cardinality of the accumulated element set Y . Security of DUA is defined as follows. Capabilities
of an adversary is defined through queries to oracle OD which models a working DUA. OD is
initialized with the tuple (f, g, Yf , u, tf ) and maintains a list of elements Y , which is initially empty.
OD responds to two types of queries, namely “add y” and “delete y.” It responds to an “add y”
query by adding y to the set Y , modifying the accumulator value v using algorithm D1 and sending
back the updated accumulator value v̂. It responds to a “delete y” query by deleting it from set Y ,
modifying the accumulator value v using algorithm D1 and sending back the updated accumulator
value v̂. In the end, OD outputs the current set Y and accumulator value v. The following is the
definition of secure DUA.
Definition 4 (Security of Dynamic Universal Accumulators (DUAs)). An universal accumulator is secure if, for any PPT algorithm A, P3 and P4 are negligible in λ, where:



(f, g, Yf , u, tf ) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← AOD (f,g,Yf ,tf ) (g ◦ f, g, Yf ) :


P3 = Pr


Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Yf0 \Y ∧ v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) ∧ Ω(w, y, v) = 1





(f, g, Yf , u, tf ) ← Gen(1λ ); (y, w, Y ) ← AOD (f,g,Yf ,tf ) (g ◦ f, g, Yf ) :


 P4 = Pr
Y ⊂ Yf0 ∧ y ∈ Y ∧ v = g ◦ f(u, Y ) ∧ Ω(w, y, v) = 1
t
u
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We state the following theorem. Its proof can be found in the full version of this paper [2].
Theorem 1. A DUA is secure if the underlying UA is secure.

t
u

Finally, a DUA-DDH is a DUA such that there exists a cyclic group G ⊂ Yf in which the DDH
assumption holds.
3.2

Constructions

We construct our DUA-DDH in stages. We first give a construction of UA for DDH groups. We
then adds the necessary algorithms for enabling dynamism.
Our UA construction This construction can be thought as the extension of Nguyen’s accumulator to support universality. Our computation of non-membership witnesses involves operations
on polynomials over finite fields.
– Generation Let λ be a security parameter. Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing such
that |G1 | = |G2 | = p for some λ-bit prime p. Let g0 be a generator of G1 and Gq = hhi be
a cyclic group of prime order q such that Gq ⊂ Z∗p .6 The generation algorithm Gen randomly
chooses α ∈R Z∗p . For simplicity, we always take the initial element u = 1, the identity element
in Zp∗ . The function f is defined as f : Z∗p × Z∗p → Z∗p such that f : u, y 7→ u(y + α). The function
g is defined as g : Z∗p × G1 such that g : y 7→ g0y . The domain Yf of accumulatable elements is
Gq 7 . The auxiliary information tf is α.
– Evaluation Computing g ◦ f(1, Y ) efficiently is straightforward with the auxiliary information
i
α. In case one wishes to allow computation of g◦f without α, one can publish g0α for i = 0 to k,
where k is the maximum
number of elements to be accumulated. If we denote the polynomial
Q
Pi=k
i
y∈Y (y+α) =
i=0 (ui α ) of maximum degree k as v(α), one can efficiently compute g◦f(1, Y )
Qi=k
v(α)
as g ◦ f(1, Y ) = g0
= i=0 giui ∈ G1 , without the knowledge of α.
– Membership witnesses The relation Ω is defined as Ω(w, y, v) = 1 if and only if
ê(w, g0y g0α ) = ê(v, g0 ). For a set of elements Y := {y1 , . . . , yk } ∈ Gq , a membership witness for
the element y ∈ Y can be computed in either one of the following ways, depending on whether
one knows the auxiliary information.
Qk
(y +α) 1
] α+y .
• (With auxiliary information.) Compute the witness as w = [g0 i=1 i
Qk
• (Without auxiliary information.) Let w(α) be the polynomial i=1,i6=j (yi + α). Expand w
Pi=k−1
Qi=k−1
w(α)
and write it as w(α) = i=0 (ui αi ). Compute the witness as w = g0
= i=0 giui ∈
G1 .
– Non-membership witnesses The relation Ω for non-membership witnesses is defined as
Ω(w, y, v) = 1 if and only if w = (c, d) and ê(c, g0y g0α )ê(g0 , g0 )d = ê(v, g0 ). For a set of elements
Y := {y1 , . . . , yk } ∈ Gq , a non-membership witness for ỹ ∈
/ Y can be computed in either one
of the following ways, depending on whether one knows the auxiliary information:
Qk
• (With auxiliary information.) Compute w = (c, d) according to d = i=1 (yi +α) mod (α+
Qk
i=1 (yi +α)−d
ỹ+α

ỹ) ∈ Zp and c = g0
∈ G1 .
Qk
• (Without auxiliary information.) Denote the polynomial v(α) as i=1 (yi + α). Compute
a polynomial division of v(α) by (α + ỹ). Since (α + ỹ) is a degree one polynomial and
ỹ 6= yi for all i, there exists a degree k − 1 polynomial c(α) and a constant d such that
Pi=k−1
v(α) = c(α)(α + ỹ) + d. Expand c and write it as c(α) = i=0 (ui αi ). Compute c =
Q
c(α)
i=k−1
g0 = i=0 giui ∈ G1 . The non-membership witness of ỹ is w = (c, d).
The theorem below states the security of our UA. Its proof can be found in the full version of
this paper [2].
Theorem 2 (Security of our UA construction). Under the k-SDH assumption in G1 , the
above construction is a secure universal accumulator.
t
u
6
7

If p = 2q + 1, one can choose a random element in h ∈R Z∗p with order q and set Gq = hhi.
Formally, it is Gq \ {−α}.
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Our DUA-DDH construction We present our construction of DUA-DDH by adding the various
dynamism algorithms D1 , D2 , D3 to our UAconstruction above. Due to Theorem 1 and 2, our
construction is secure under the k-SDH assumption.
– Update of accumulator (algorithm D1 ) Adding an element ŷ to the accumulator value v
can be done by computing v̂ = v ŷ+α . Similarly, deleting an element ŷ in the accumulator v
1
can be done by computing v̂ = v ŷ+α . Both cases require the auxiliary information α.
– Update of membership witnesses (algorithm D2 ) Let w be the original membership
witness of y w.r.t the accumulator value v. Let v̂ and ŷ be the new accumulator value and the
element added (resp. deleted) respectively. Suppose ŷ has been added, the new membership
witness ŵ for y can be computed as vwŷ−y . Suppose ŷ 6= y has been deleted, the new non1
1
membership witness ŵ for y can be computed as w ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ .
– Update of non-membership witnesses (algorithm D3 ) Let c, d be the original nonmembership witness of y w.r.t. accumulator value v. Let v̂ and ŷ be the new accumulator
value and the element added (resp. deleted) respectively.
• (Addition.) Suppose ŷ 6= y has been added, the new non-membership witness ĉ, dˆ of y can
be computed as ĉ = vcŷ−y ∈ G1 and dˆ = d(ŷ − y) ∈ Z∗p . This can be verified as follows:
v̂ =v α+ŷ = v (α+y)+(ŷ−y) = v α+y v ŷ−y = v α+y (cα+y g0d )ŷ−y
d(ŷ−y)

=[vcŷ−y ]α+y g0

ˆ

= ĉα+y g0d

• (Deletion.) Suppose ŷ has been deleted, the new non-membership witness ĉ, dˆ of y can be
1
d
∈ Z∗p . Indeed,
computed as ĉ = (cv̂ −1 ) ŷ−y ∈ G1 and dˆ = ŷ−y
v̂ =v̂

(α+ŷ)−(α+y)
ŷ−y

1

α+y

1

α+y

= v ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ = [cα+y g0d ] ŷ−y v̂ y−ŷ
1

1

d

ˆ

=[(cv̂ −1 )α+y g0d ] ŷ−y = [(cv̂ −1 ) ŷ−y ]α+y g0ŷ−y = ĉα+y g0d

4

Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Our DUA-DDH

We present several efficient zero-knowledge protocols for our DUA-DDH construction. In the presentation, we give priority to clarity over efficiency; the protocols may be optimized for better
performance.
Let G1 = hgi and Gq = hhi be cyclic groups of prime order p and q respectively, such that
Gq ⊂ Z∗p is the domain of our DUA-DDH construction. Let g0 , g1 and h0 , h1 , h2 be independent
generators of G1 and Gq respectively. Let y = hx0 ∈ Gq and let C = gy0 gr1 ∈ G1 be the commitment
of y using random number r. Let v be an accumulator value.
4.1

Proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of a committed element

This protocol is the main building block of the protocols used in our DUA-DDH construction. We
call it PK1 . Let D = hx1 hs2 ∈ Gq be the commitment of x using some random number s. The goal
of PK1 is to prove the knowledge of x and y such that y = hx0 in zero-knowledge, thus without
revealing, e.g., x or y. In other words, we have:



PK1 y, r, x, s : C = gy0 gr1 ∧ D = hx1 hs2 ∧ y = hx0
The protocol can be used with the common discrete logarithm relationship proofs [9] to demonstrate relationships of discrete logarithms in G1 or Gq . Instantiation of PK1 makes use of the
zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of double discrete logarithms [14], as we now describe. Let λk
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be a security parameter that determines the cheating probability of the protocol. (The cheating
probability is 2−λk , we hence suggest λk = 80.) PK1 consists of PK1A and PK1B as follows.





y r

PK1A
y, r : C = g0 g1



PK1






hx
x s
0 r

x, r, s : C = g0 g1 ∧ D = h1 h2
 PK1B
Instantiating PK1A is straightforward. Below we only show how to instantiate PK1B .
(Commitment.) For i = 1 to λk , the prover randomly generates ρx,i , ρs,i ∈R Zq and ρr,i ∈R Zp ,
ρx,i

h

ρ

ρ

ρ

computes T1,i = g0 0 g1r,i ∈ G1 and T2,i = h1x,i h2s,i ∈ Gq , and sends T1,i , T2,i to the verifier.
(Challenge.) The verifier randomly generates a λk -bit challenge m and sends it to the prover.
(Response.) Denote by m[i] the i-th bit of m, starting from i = 1. For i = 1 to λk , the prover
computes zx,i = ρx,i − m[i]x ∈ Zq , zs,i = ρs,i − m[i]s ∈ Zq and zri = ρr,i − m[i]hx0 r ∈ Zp . She
λ k
sends zx,i , zs,i , zr,i i=1
to the verifier.
(Verify.) The verifier outputs 1 if the following holds for all i = 1 to λk . He outputs 0 otherwise.
( zx,i
h
z
?
?
g0 0 g1r,i , if m[i] = 0,
m[i] zx,i zs,i
T2,i = D h1 h2
and T1,i =
zx,i
z
Ch0 g1r,i , otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that PK1 is Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. It can be converted
into a 4-round perfect zero-knowledge protocol using the technique due to Cramer et al. [15]
or 3-move concurrent zero-knowledge protocol in the auxiliary string model based on trapdoor
commitment schemes [17]. Note that the prover does not need to explicitly prove that the r in
PK1A and PK1B are the same; they are bounded to be the same under the discrete logarithm
assumption.
4.2

Proof of knowledge of a committed element in an accumulator value

Suppose y is in the accumulator value v. That is, there exists witness w such that Ω(w, y, v) = 1.
The following protocol demonstrates that the element y, committed as C, is in the accumulator
value v.



y α
y r
PK2 w, y, r : ê(w, g0 g0 ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ C = g0 g1
PK2 can be instantiated using the standard proof-of-knowledge of an SDH-tuple [8,1].
Combining PK1 and PK2 , we have a protocol, denoted as PK3 , that proves the knowledge of
the discrete logarithm of an element in an accumulator value:



PK3 w, y, x : ê(w, g0y g0α ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ y = hx0
4.3

Proof of knowledge of a committed element not in an accumulator value

Suppose y is not in the accumulator value v. Then there exists witness w = (c, d) such that d 6= 0
and Ω(w, y, v) = 1. The following protocol demonstrates that the element y, committed as C, is
not in the accumulator value v.



y α
y r
d
PK4 c, d, y, r : ê(c, g0 g0 ) = ê(v, g0 )ê(g0 , g0 ) ∧ d 6= 0 ∧ C = g0 g1
PK4 can be instantiated using standard techniques, which we describe in the full version of
this paper [2].
Combining PK1 and PK4 , we have a protocol, denoted as PK5 , that proves the knowledge of
the discrete logarithm of an element not in an accumulator value:



y α
d
x
PK5 c, d, y, x : ê(c, g0 g0 )ê(g0 , g0 ) = ê(v, g0 ) ∧ d 6= 0 ∧ y = h0
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Concluding Remarks

We have presented the first dynamic universal accumulator construction for accumulating elements
in DDH-hard groups and a number of useful zero-knowledge protocols for it. Using this accumulator, we have built an Attribute-Based Anonymous Credential System, which allows the verifier
to authenticate anonymous users according to any access control policy expressible as formula of
boolean user attributes in the DNF form. Our system features many practicality and scalability
properties for a large-scale deployment of privacy-preserving access control in a heterogeneous and
decentralized environment.
We end the paper with two research questions that we believe to be worth exploring in the
future. The first one is how one can construct ABACS that also efficiently supports numeric attributes. (While one could certainly encode a numerical attribute by a bunch of boolean attributes,
that wouldn’t be very efficient.) The second question is how one can construct ABACS that avoids
the need to prove double discrete logarithms, and hence achieves better efficiency.
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